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TERRORISM AND THE NEW SECURITY DILEMMA
Philip G. Cerny

S

ince 11 September 2001, the primary focus of American foreign policy has ostensibly been the “war on terror,” although the George W. Bush administration has also given priority to other objectives, such as Iraq and national missile
defense. This emphasis on the threat of terrorism is extremely valuable for analytical purposes, because it draws attention to key aspects of security today—in
particular the central paradox of how to deal with the increasingly diffuse character of threats with the means available to state actors, in what is still to a large
extent an interstate system. There are at least two aspects to this problematic.
The first is assessing the appropriate or most effective role of states and great
powers in reacting to and dealing with terrorism and other direct forms of violence. The second is the relationship of contemporary forms of violence to wider
social, economic, and political issues characteristic of the twenty-first century—
issues that themselves are becoming increasingly transnationalized and
globalized.

GLOBALIZATION AND INSECURITY IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
With regard to responding to threats of terrorist violence, on the one hand, terrorism is portrayed as a phenomenon unlike previous generalized threats. Although specific instances of terrorism in history are legion, they have been
sporadic and geographically circumscribed. However, terrorism, like other security issues, has in the twenty-first century become a more and more transnational form of violence or warfare. Today it involves networks and patterns of
violence that do not resemble the kind of “international” warfare among states
that has dominated the international system since the seventeenth century. In
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particular, the quasi-random targeting of civilians rather than military forces is
widely seen as a fundamental, bottom-line element of the very definition of terror1
ism. The development of terrorism as a cross-border, nonstate, network-based
phenomenon goes contrary to the general perception in “realist” international relations analysis that the most significant threats to international security come from
states rather than from nonstate actors. On the other hand, American policy makers
today still see terrorism as depending crucially on states for its spread and impact—
a perspective that fits with realist preconceptions and is seen to call for traditional
national, great power–based military responses. As a recent authoritative analysis
of contemporary American foreign policy has argued, the “link between terrorist organizations and state sponsors became the ‘principal strategic thought underlying our strategy in the war on terrorism,’ according to Douglas Feith, the
third-ranking official in the Pentagon.” Thus “while terrorists might be described as ‘stateless,’ they ultimately depended on regimes like the Taliban [in
2
Afghanistan] to operate.”
At the same time, the underlying causes and principal motives of terrorist violence are framed by the identification by American policy makers of terrorists
themselves as “evil,” motivated only or primarily by a hatred of freedom and of
3
America’s role in spreading freedom. Its state sponsors are seen to form an “axis
of evil” and to have become the chief threats to world order. Therefore the underlying structure of the threat that terrorism embodies for international security is believed by key policy makers in the Bush administration to be
fundamentally mediated through and determined by the structure and dynamics of the states system. Indeed, the “hegemonists” (as they have been called) in
the Bush administration have integrated terrorism into a state-centric view of
international relations and have prescribed unilateral, state-based American
4
leadership as the appropriate response.
In contrast, this article argues that terrorism is merely one dimension of a
wider phenomenon that is transforming the international system and domestic
politics too around the world—neomedievalism, a phenomenon that is leading
to the emergence of a new security dilemma in world politics. Both of these concepts will be specified in more detail later in this article. However, broadly speaking, neomedievalism means that we are increasingly in the presence of a
plurality of overlapping, competing, and intersecting power structures—institutions, political processes, economic developments, and social transformations—above, below, and cutting across states and the states system. States today
represent only one level of this power structure, becoming more diffuse, internally split, and enmeshed in wider complex webs of power. This structure is fluid
and fungible, feeding back and undergoing continual adjustments and ad hoc
responses to a rapidly changing environment. In this context, the definition of
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what is a “security” issue is also becoming more and more fluid and fungible—
including the dislocations caused by economic development; the destabilizing
effect of transitions to democracy; the undermining of traditional cultures, be5
liefs, and loyalties; threats to the environmental and public health; and the like.
The nineteenth and twentieth centuries experienced similar challenges, and
these led to two world wars and the Cold War; however, the economic and political environment of that time actually strengthened the central role of nationstates and of the states system as the main providers of security. Today, they are
making this role more and more problematic.
This transformation in turn gives rise to what I have called the “New Security
6
Dilemma.” The idea behind the New Security Dilemma is that states are increasingly cut across and hedged around by a range of complex new structural developments and sociopolitical forces that, taken together, are leading to the
crystallization of a globalizing world order—more correctly, a “durable disorder”—that in crucial ways looks more like the order of late medieval society than
like the world of “mod7
ern” nation-states. As anA new sense of generalized insecurity has emerged,
alysts have pointed out,
reflecting the fact that the provision of security itself
many recent international
as a public good can no longer be guaranteed by the
relations theorists have
states system.
argued that globalization,
“the growing economic, political, and social interconnectedness of nations that
had resulted from increased trade and financial ties and the rapid advance in communications technology . . . was undercutting the authority of individual states,
with power flowing to nonstate actors such as private corporations and transna8
tional activist groups.” However, “Bush and his advisors would have none of it.”
This article argues the converse, that the core problems of security in the
twenty-first-century world profoundly reflect these globalizing and
transnationalizing trends—and their underlying social, political, and economic
causes—and that they can be addressed only by reassessing fundamental notions of security. In particular, there has been a clear shift in the dominant form
of violence and conflict from one characterized by interstate wars to one in
which civil wars, cross-border wars, and “low intensity” or guerrilla-type wars—
9
including terrorism—increasingly predominate and proliferate. Of course,
civil and cross-border wars are nothing new, and terrorism has been with us
10
throughout human history. However, their interconnectedness and the way
they are inextricably intertwined with other aspects of globalization—linkages that cut across states and crystallize below the level of states—is the key to
11
understanding the nature of contemporary security and insecurity. Terrorism
reflects deeper and wider structural changes. In this sense, a war on terror
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cannot be a simple war of armed forces but must be a sociopolitical process.
Rather than a “war on terror,” what is needed is to transform security itself, to
make it less like war and more like what the social theorist Michel Foucault,
writing in the tradition of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century social philosophy, called “police”—not merely policing in the sense of countering violence
and imposing order but pursuing a civilianization of politics and society, stress12
ing social development, welfare, and good governance.
This interconnectedness, of course, reflects not only transnational economic
interdependence, usually seen to be the root of globalization, but also a wide
range of other related social and political developments. New information and
communication technologies have intensified pressures resulting from the interaction of previously nationally compartmentalized social and cultural cate13
gories, with an emphasis on the sheer speed of that interaction. The
development of Marshall McLuhan’s “global village” has been paralleled—or,
for some, superseded—by a postmodernist fragmentation of cultures and soci14
eties. In political terms, the reidentification of societies as “multicultural,” emphasizing shifting identities and loyalties, is unraveling the consolidation of
national culture societies that was at the heart of the modern nation-state proj15
ect from Bismarck’s Kulturkampf to postcolonial “nation-building.” Many
major social causes and “cause” pressure groups, such as nongovernmental organizations, as well as sectoral interest groups, are becoming less concerned with
negotiating direct benefits from the state and more focused on such crosscutting
transnational issues as the environment, women’s issues, land mines, political
16
prisoners, sustainable development, and the like. Furthermore, the end of the
Cold War unleashed a huge number of social and political grievances that had
previously been kept in ideological and political check through direct or indirect
superpower control.
National-territorial institutions—states—are thus being overlaid, crosscut,
and challenged by a range of less institutionally bound issues, demands, and
groups, bridging the micro level, the meso (intermediate) level, and the transnational in ways the state cannot. In this context, those who believe that any one
nation-state—even one like the United States that possesses several times the
military capabilities of other major powers, let alone minor ones—is in a position unilaterally to provide security as a public good to the global system as a
whole are living in cloud-cuckoo-land. Hegemony is not a feasible goal reflecting the realities of the twenty-first century but an attempt to reconstruct the history of the 1950s without the Soviet Union. In a neomedieval world, more
complex political, economic, and social approaches are required to fill the basic
security gap that results from the multilayered, crosscutting, and asymmetric
global and transnational structures of the third millennium.
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THE NEW SECURITY DILEMMA
The central dynamic mechanism of stabilization and ordering in the traditional
17
realist states system has been called the “security dilemma.” This was the notion
that perceived external threats generate feelings of insecurity in states that believe themselves to be the targets of such threats, and that these states take measures to counteract those threats (alliances, arms buildups, etc.). These
countermeasures are in turn perceived as threatening by other states, leading to
feedback in the form of counter-countermeasures, eventually undermining existing balances of power and creating a vicious circle of ever-increasing insecurity among states. The notion of the “arms race” is the best-known paradigm
case of how the traditional security dilemma works. As occurred at the outbreak
of World War I, this process can get out of hand.
But the traditional security dilemma is also what links order and change in
the realist approach. Only by creating and recreating balances of power—
whether through war, development and manipulation of power resources, or
politically effective (strong-willed) foreign policy—can this tendency to system
breakdown be counteracted and stabilized, at least for long periods, periods usually punctuated by system-rebalancing wars. The breakdown of one balance of
power must be replaced by another if conflict is to be minimized. Such an analy18
sis has been at the heart of both classical realism and neorealism. But that dynamic does not work in the same way, if at all, in a more transnationally
interconnected world. Changes in the character of the security dilemma since
the end of the Cold War have not resulted simply from the breakdown of one
particular balance of power—that is, of the bipolar balance between United
States and the Soviet Union. Rather, recent changes profoundly reflect the increasing ineffectiveness of interstate balances of power as such to regulate the international system.
The failure of large powers in the 1970s and 1980s to determine outcomes in
the Third World through traditional security means—the most salient examples
being Vietnam for the United States and the Sino-Soviet split (and later Angola
and Afghanistan) for the Soviet Union—was the first major shock to the balanceof-power system itself. The later demise of the Soviet Union did not result just
from change in its relative overall power position vis-à-vis the United States.
More accurately, the USSR collapsed because of the evolving configuration and
interaction of both domestic and transnational pressures stemming from its
technological backwardness, international economic interdependence, awareness of social and cultural alternatives by individuals and groups made possible
by international contacts and communications, the growth of consumerism and
other pressures for “modernization,” etc.—with all of which the Soviet Union
was less and less able to cope in a more interconnected world. Likewise, growing
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complex interdependence in the West undermined the hierarchical alliance
structures set up in the postwar period by the United States—for example, with
19
the development of Gaullism in France. Paradoxically, both superpowers became weaker in systemic terms, because traditional forms of power could not
cope with the globalizing challenges of the late-twentieth-century international
order.
Those challenges were and are particularly stark in the security arena. The
lack of utility not only of nuclear weapons, increasingly seen as unthinkable and
unusable, but also of limited, low-intensity (guerrilla) warfare—more and more
costly and counterproductive for the big powers, as demonstrated in Vietnam
and Afghanistan—means now that neither national nor collective security can
any longer be reliably based on balances of power among nation-states, and
great powers in particular, per se. A new sense of generalized insecurity has
emerged, represented not only “from above,” by the threat of proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction but also “from below,” by the rise of civil wars,
tribal and religious conflicts, terrorism, civil violence in developed countries,
the international drugs trade, etc. This sense of insecurity reflects the fact that
the provision of security itself as a public good—the very raison d’être of the
states system—can no longer be guaranteed by that system.
In the New Security Dilemma, a new range of incentives is emerging for players—especially nonstate actors but some state actors too—to opt out of the states
system itself, unless restrained from doing so by the as yet embryonic constraints
of complex, especially economic, interdependence. The costs to remaining states
are rising dramatically, as globalization increasingly enmeshes actors—and
states—in complex, crosscutting webs of wealth, power, and social relationships.
Indeed, to hijack the language of neorealist international relations theory, states
are not concerned primarily with “relative gains,” their place as states in the international pecking order vis-à-vis other states, but increasingly (thanks to the
revolution of rising expectations linked with globalization) with “absolute
gains”—better standards of living, individual security, human dignity, and the
ability to participate freely in social life. These expectations are undermined by
war and by the imperatives of national military organization.
International relations are therefore no longer dominated by holistic, indivisible national interests and collective fears for national survival but rather by divisible benefits pursued by pluralistic, often cross-national networks of
individuals and groups, whether peaceful, as in the context of “global civil society,” or violent, as in the case of terrorism. In an inversion of the famous quotation from President John F. Kennedy’s 1961 inaugural address—“And so,
my fellow Americans: ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you
can do for your country”—people are less and less satisfied with what their
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countries can do for them. They are finding more and more alternative forms of
identity and action—from the Internet to links with diasporas and “global
tribes,” from anti-globalization protests to religious fundamentalism, and from
20
“epistemic communities” to terrorist networks.
This situation has led not only to the rise of new actors and forces below and
cutting across the level of the state but also to attempts to reinforce and rebuild
state power and the interstate system, in futile attempts to turn back the clock.
One manifestation of the latter is the U.S. attempt to counteract terrorism
through a more focused
and vigorous applicaRather than a “war on terror,” what is needed is to
tion of military force, as
transform security itself—pursuing a civilianization
exemplified by the Bush
of politics and society, stressing social development,
administration and the
welfare, and good governance.
long-contemplated war
21
in Iraq. A contrasting manifestation, however, is the attempt by some European states, especially France and Germany, to emphasize multilateral rather
than unilateral power balancing, especially through the United Nations. Both of
these responses essentially involve a process of “catch-up,” lagging the development of micro- and meso-level processes and therefore highly vulnerable to “defection,” as the game theorists say—to players quitting the game and heading off
on their own. The postwar situation in Iraq abounds with examples of these processes in action, as fragmented groups with contradictory aims create insecurity
for both the occupying powers and ordinary Iraqis, and as international alliances shift around reconstruction contracts, potential peacekeeping participation, the role of the American-supported interim government, etc. Cases in
point include the 2004 elections in Spain and the emergence of the war in Iraq as
the most contentious issue in the 2004 American presidential election
campaign.
Perhaps most importantly, attempts to provide international and domestic
security through the state and the states system—especially the U.S. attempt to
use its power to regulate and control that system unilaterally—are becoming increasingly dysfunctional. They create severe and diverse backlashes at local,
transnational, and hegemonic levels, backlashes that further weaken states and
undermine wider security. Terrorism, the most extreme example of such a backlash, often actually gains sympathy, adherents, and momentum from the attempts of states to repress it.
Furthermore, these backlashes do not develop in a vacuum. They interact
with economic and social processes of complex globalization to create overlapping and competing cross-border networks of power, shifting loyalties and identities, and new sources of endemic low-level conflict—the “durable disorder”
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mentioned earlier. Indeed, the notion of a vicious circle inherent in the traditional security dilemma is transposed into the New Security Dilemma, but at an
entirely different level. To begin with, attempts to address insecurities through
traditional forms of state power, especially hegemony, create further insecurities
that provoke backlashes. These backlashes in turn draw both states and nonstate
actors farther into the quagmires of ethnic and religious conflict, warlordism,
and tribalism, ineffective or collapsed states, and ever-increasing calls on military, political, and economic resources. Such responses simply provoke further
resentment, frustration, and hopelessness, and breed endemic low-level conflict.
Supposedly hegemonic powers are thus sucked into a widening security gap of
their own making.
THE NEOMEDIEVAL SCENARIO
In order to understand the overall pattern and direction of these changes, it can
be heuristically useful to reframe the problem through an unusual but suggestive historical analogy, an analogy that paints a wider picture. In this case, we
start from the assertion that nation-states are simply not what they used to be.
Rather than being able to make certain kinds of domestic public policy in ways
that are insulated from “external” constraints and to support commonly held
social values through centralized institutions—what neorealist theorists think
of as the essential “hierarchical” character of the state—nation-state-based institutions and processes are increasingly being transformed into transmission
belts and enforcement mechanisms for outcomes arrived at on myriad diverse
levels across the wider global system. The line between the “inside” and the “outside” is increasingly blurred structurally and transgressed by all sorts of actors.
At the same time, however, this global system is itself becoming more and more
institutionally diverse and complex, characterized by attributes that echo features of a world apparently lost since the decay of feudalism and the early rise of
the nation-state in the fourteenth through seventeenth centuries.
Today we live in an era of increasing speed, global scale, and the extremely
rapid diffusion of information and technological innovation—characteristics
that seem to be outgrowing the political capacities of the existing institutional
order, just as analogous long-term trends outgrew the old order of the Middle
22
Ages. In an exercise of what is generally called “neomedievalism,” we will be
looking here at various widely noted features of the medieval world, especially
the late medieval world, in order to draw lessons for the present. These features
include:

• Competing institutions with overlapping jurisdictions (states, regimes,
transgovernmental networks, private interest governments, etc.)
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• More fluid territorial boundaries (both within and across states) and a lack
of exogenous territorializing pressures

• The uneven consolidation of spaces, cleavages, conflicts, and inequalities,
including both unevenly developing new spaces and the fragmentation of
old spaces

• Multiple or fragmented loyalties and identities
• The spread of what have been called “zones grises,” gray zones, geographical
areas and social contexts where the rule of law does not run.

23

Neomedievalism as a concept is notable primarily for its metaphorical value.
In contrast to “modern” notions of statehood or sovereignty, medieval societies
were characterized by multiple, overlapping hierarchies and institutions; their
structures were multilayered and asymmetric, involving diverse types of authority and social bonds, competing with each other within the same broad and generally ill-defined territorial expanse. As such societies expanded, they
increasingly interacted, intersected, and overlapped. In many ways they were
victims of their own success, as feudalism led over time to tremendous economic growth and social development. Smaller units like village and tribal/clan
societies, unless highly isolated, were drawn into wider systems of competing
landlord/warlord relationships, in which layers of hierarchy were permeable and
territorial frontiers fluid; these were in turn pulled into wider monarchical and
imperial systems, ranging from coherent, quasi-confederal empires to tributary
and suzerain systems with little social unity from below. Religious hierarchies
frequently crosscut such systems in complex ways; trade routes and fairs sustained a limited market economy, usually on the margins but with growing
structural impact; and cities increasingly provided havens for groups that found
themselves either on the periphery of, or able relatively easily to navigate across,
the complex inner boundaries (and often external frontiers too) of the
premodern world. Communications and transport systems obviously constituted a key set of technological constraints and opportunities within which such
24
societies could evolve.
Although the emergence of modern nation-states—and the states system—
from this milieu was a complex (and today controversial) matter, that process
was always far more than a mere shift from fluid, overlapping structures to rigid
hierarchies inside and anarchy outside, as neorealist theory would have it. In
contrast, national economies themselves evolved in the context of growing
trade, an increasing global division of labor, and the spread of international
25
markets for commodities and finance; national societies provided the breeding
ground for both the secular Enlightenment and the spread of modern
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universalistic religions; and the emergence of the modern state gave rise to different yet analogous political systems based on bureaucratic rationality, economic modernization, and indeed, competition among themselves, both
26
economic and military. The states system is by no means therefore the antithesis
of globalization but its precursor and progenitor. States—and the interstate system—have created the very conditions for their obsolescence or transcendence
in an interdependent, crosscutting international and transnational system. The
main problem is, of course, that the very success of the state as an embedded institutional structure is also its prison. The nation-state both creates and underpins globalization processes, on the one hand, and prevents those processes
from effectively rearticulating governance at a “higher” level, on the other.27
In this context, states are losing their capacity to provide the public good of
security, while collective governance institutions have a long way to go before
they can develop that capacity. Several features of today’s neomedieval world
feed into this basic security deficit.
Multiple Competing Institutions
The first—and most important—characteristic of the medieval system, already
mentioned, was that of competing institutions with overlapping jurisdictions.
The early (or pre-) medieval order in Europe, often called the Dark Ages, was a
period of extreme localism. Roman-era trade routes were abandoned, imperial
legal norms forgotten, and political power fragmented and diffused. Village and
local societies exchanged obeisance and sharecropping in return for military
protection from relatively localized predators, giving rise to overlapping claims
to power and territorial lordship. These arrangements nevertheless laid the
groundwork for a basic social stability that enabled economic production to expand, trade routes and cities to grow, and political and legal institutions to develop at different levels.
The Roman Catholic Church developed an extensive, complex hierarchy to
monitor and control its vast lands and activities, giving it a certain overarching
authority that often conflicted with regional and local power centers. As more
surplus goods came to be produced, expropriated, and exchanged, merchants,
financiers, artisans, and laborers created guilds and urban corporations, which
interacted with preexisting hierarchies. Territorial frontiers were overlapping
and ill defined, giving rise to endemic low-level warfare over land and other resources, although the outcomes of such warfare increasingly created precedents
of control that crystallized into more formal boundaries over time. The pyramid
of wealth and control steepened, and the competing dynastic monarchies claiming to inhabit the apex consolidated; significant sectors of the feudal economy
(urban production, moneylending and finance, long-distance trade, etc.) grew
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in autonomy and interdependence; and military and taxation bureaucracies became institutionalized. In these ways the stage was set for the nation-state to
emerge from the creative destruction of the warfare of the fifteenth through sev28
enteenth centuries. The feudal nobility did not lose its power and wealth;
29
rather, it was absorbed into the system. These changes enabled more militarily,
bureaucratically, socially, and economically organized nation-states to develop.
Today, this process of state consolidation is being, if not actually reversed, at
least significantly modified and reshaped. Overlapping and competing jurisdictions and socioeconomic arrangements are creating a world that looks more and
more like a medieval one. In the first place, states themselves are being transformed into structures that will be better able to survive in a multilayered/
30
multitiered global context, that of the “competition state.” Monitoring and
regulating economic activities are likely to differ from sector to sector, depending upon the scope and scale of the microeconomic and mesoeconomic characteristics of each sector—especially its degree of transnationalization—with
the effective purview of states limited to those sectors the organization of
which structurally corresponds to the requirements of effective promotion,
31
monitoring, and control at a national/territorial level. Nation-states will
probably look more like American states within the U.S. federal system—with
circumscribed remits but important residual policy instruments and the ability
to exploit niches in the wider system through limited taxation and regulation.
They will be analogous to what have been called “postfeudal residual aristocracies” in a more and more globally integrated capitalist environment, focusing on
what is good for their own domestic estates—the benefits of globalization—
while seeking not to lose too much power and prestige to the nouveaux riches or
transnational elites and new transgovernmental bureaucracies of the global
32
economy.
Further, in the international political economy, transnational regimes, new
forms of private economic organization, transnational strategic alliances, and
the globalization of financial markets are forcing a convergence and homogenization of the rules, procedures, and outcomes of public policy formulation and
33
of implementation across borders. In addition to transnational interest group
formation and the development of transgovernmental coalitions bringing regulators and policy makers in overlapping spheres into regular networks that cut
across “splintered states,” this rapid but asymmetric multilayering of political
and economic institutions is leading to the emergence of quasi-public,
quasi-private dispute-settlement regimes seeking to arbitrate competing claims
for rights and privileges—the core of what has been called the “privatization of
34
governance.”
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Probably the most consensual and homogenizing dimension of globalization
is the spread of Western, capitalist conceptions of property rights at both national and international levels. However, as has been argued, the lack of effective
private-property-rights regimes in developing countries not only undermines
their endogenous development but condemns those countries to continued
predatory impositions by transnational economic actors, especially where the
35
latter are allied to local and state elites. In addition, it could be said that with
regard to intellectual property rights in particular, capitalist society developed
despite rather than because of the existence of an intellectual-propertyrights regime, as the result of diffusion of ideas treated as public goods. If a
strict intellectual-property-rights regime were to be constructed, it might
actually prevent such diffusion in the future, leading to a new form of “enclosure” that would reinforce other social, economic, and political asymme36
tries in a neomedieval world.
Therefore, the fact that the state is increasingly enmeshed in crosscutting
economic, social, political, and indeed “transgovernmental” webs (where state
actors are exposed to transnational pressures and linked into transnational networks) and that a range of complex, asymmetric, crosscutting authoritative institutions are being created or adapted to operate in a globalizing world are, in
combination, leading to the crystallization of a global quasi-order that looks
more like the medieval world than the “modern” nation-state system of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Even in the security area—the “bottom line” of the modern nation-state—the intersection of economic globalization, multiculturalism, proliferation of multilevel institutions, and the like, on
the one hand, and the fragmentation of techniques, tactics, and strategies of
warfare along the lines of low-intensity wars, civil wars, terrorism, and the “revolution in military affairs,” on the other, looks more like the fragmented, multilevel warfare of the Middle Ages than like the “total wars” of the first half of the
twentieth century. Clausewitz’s dictum that “war is the continuation of politics
by other means” refers today less to the clashes of nation-states than to the
clashes of so many different social, economic, and political forces under, over,
and cutting across the nation-state level and increasingly defecting from the
37
states system itself.
Fluid Boundaries and the Lack of Exogenous Territorializing Pressures
The main causal factor missing from this process today, one that was nevertheless crucial for the transition from feudalism to the nation-state, is that of exogenous systemic competition. Embryonic nation-states in the late and post-feudal
periods consolidated domestically to a large extent because they continually
clashed with other—comparable—pretenders to stateness, national wealth, and
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autonomy. The institutionalization of competition and conflict between and
among increasingly powerful European dynastic families in the late medieval
period led to the expansion of state bureaucracies and their growing penetration
into more and more exclusively territorialized—national—social and economic
bases. However, just as the Chinese Empire, in Paul Kennedy’s analysis, stagnated because it experienced no fundamental external threat for many centuries,
so today’s neomedieval international order faces no direct exogenous political
or military pressures for institutional consolidation at a global or transnational
38
level—unless something like a Martian invasion occurs, of course. The United
Nations, for example, has no external enemy to fight and therefore no way of
turning a potential outside threat into a question of survival—a situation that
constrains its capacity to institutionalize “collective security.” Thus an increasingly dense, multilayered, and asymmetric set of competing institutions with
overlapping jurisdictions—including and enmeshing, not breaking up, the residual nation-state—will stumble on, untroubled by exogenous pressures to
consolidate.
In this context, nation-states will find—weaker states first, stronger states
later on—that their territorial and authoritative boundaries will effectively become more fluid. Of course, legal sovereignty is not formally threatened, state
borders still appear as real lines on the map, and guarantees of diplomatic recognition and of membership in certain international institutions remain. Substate
ethnic and separatist movements, however, increasingly threaten the cohesion
of collapsing states (like Lebanon and Somalia), “transnational territories”
(such as those unevenly controlled until recently by the National Patriotic Front
of Liberia), and so-called archipelago states like the former Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo),
at the same time that such
States today represent only one level of this power
states cling to existing borstructure, becoming more diffuse, internally split,
ders for dear life, in the
and enmeshed in wider complex webs of power.
name of elite legitimacy and
39
continued control. Iraq in mid-2004 is an excellent example, where ethnic rivalries have led some actors—and even Western analysts—to call for the
breakup of the country into Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish states, yet all three groups
are aware that such a development would reduce their overall power both internally and externally. Therefore it is unlikely that the actual breakup of nationstates per se will be as significant a development as the exogenous and endogenous
differentiation of their authority, as discussed above—especially for the older
and wealthier nation-states of the North. Nevertheless, centrifugal pressures on
“empire-states” like Russia and China are likely to grow in importance as the
penetration of crosscutting sectoral and market pressures expands within those
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territories and as groups like Chechens and Uighurs develop a sense of being
40
collective players in the wider game.
At another level, the emergence of international or transnational regions is
playing an increasing role in territorial organization. However, what is most interesting about these regions is not their institutional coherence or suprastatelike structural form; indeed, the European Union is the only region with
that sort of quasi-state coherence (although even that is in doubt, with the recent travails of the proposed European Constitution). What is most interesting
is that regions are themselves multilevel, asymmetric entities, with crisscrossing
internal fault lines—subregions, cross-border regions, local regions, not merely
“nested” but often conflicting, with national, transnational, and subnational rivalries poorly integrated—based mainly on the density of transactions that in
41
turn reflect the complexity and circularity of wider globalization processes. It
is the diversity of their internal structures and external linkages that is most
striking, not their similarity. The recent trend toward developing the concept of
“multilevel governance” simply reveals the complexity and variance inherent in
regional projects.
Finally, the main significance of the recent war in Iraq in this context is the
fact that it long formed a crucial part of a project to counteract the kind of
fissiparousness associated with globalization by militarily ratcheting up the
United States into a hegemonic empire. On the one hand, despite overwhelming
U.S. military spending and force levels—including the various technological developments usually brought together under the rubric of the “revolution in military affairs”—a number of problems stemming from the attempt to build new
domestic structures in collapsed or defeated states, such as Somalia in 1992–93
and contemporary Afghanistan, imply the need for a strategy of reconstruction
42
that can only be ongoing, interventionist, and well organized. Other nationstates, although increasingly enmeshed in various global and transnational economic and social webs, are unlikely simply to cede the hegemonic ground to the
United States and will increasingly seek to counterbalance American power, especially by other means.
Probably the most interesting potential aspect of such behavior is that it will
not necessarily take the form of specifically military balancing, although there
will be a certain new willingness to reverse the decline of military establishments
in Europe, Russia, etc. Rather, we are witnessing the revival of an old idea from
the 1960s, that of the emergence of a whole new category, the “civilian superpower,” the strength of which comes from its economy and from the political
43
clout that its economy brings. The European Union has never aspired to be a
military superpower, although military cooperation is increasing. American hegemonic pretensions are likely not so much to provoke further European
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military consolidation as to accelerate attempts to develop and expand Europe’s
“civilian” influence on world affairs—an influence that is likely to be far more attractive in other parts of the world, too, when it comes to creating alliances and
below-the-state networks of influence. Finally, international institutions such as
the United Nations, the various international economic institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and political processes such as
G-8 meetings and trade negotiations—often lumped together under the rubric
of “global governance”—are likely to have been sidelined only temporarily by
44
the war in Iraq.
The Uneven Consolidation of New Spaces, Borders, Cleavages,
Conflicts, and Inequalities
The main structural fault lines—political, social, and economic—in this complex world reflect not clear territorial boundaries enclosing hierarchical authority structures but rather new distinctions between different levels of economic
cleavage and urban/rural splits. The academic literature on global cities, for example, reflects the concept that a range of “virtual spaces” in the global political
economy will increasingly overlap with, and possibly even replace, the “real”
space of traditional geographical/topological territories, in a process that has
been called “denationalization.”45 These new spaces are embodied—and increasingly embedded—in transaction flows, infrastructural nodes of communications and information technology, corporate headquarters, “edge city” living
complexes for “symbolic analysts,” increasingly “dematerialized” financial mar46
kets, and cultural and media centers of activity (and identity). According to
Christopher May, control of new ideas and innovations will come to be increasingly concentrated in such areas, protected and secured by a growing panoply of
47
international and transnational intellectual property rights.
The specific spaces that people perceive and identify with are likely to become
increasingly localized or micro-level in structure—in the Middle Ages, space
was highly localized, of course. People may even lose their very perception of
space as partitioned vertically and learn over time to “navigate” between different overlapping, asymmetric layers of spatial perception and organization, in a
48
process of “fragmegration”—a dialectic of fragmentation and integration.
On the one hand, there will be continual fragmentation of old spaces, in a
process that will be both asymmetrical and episodic, giving rise to newly entrenched spatial inequalities. The poorer residents of such areas will find themselves increasingly excluded from decision-making processes. In areas where
navigation among complex structural layers is more difficult—for example,
where such nodes, infrastructure, activities, etc., do not exist within easy reach
or perception, such as across large geographical spaces—many people will

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss1/2

16

Cerny: Terrorism and the New Security Dilemma
26

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

simply be “out of the loop,” country bumpkins or even roaming, deprived bands,
49
“primitive rebels.” Consider contemporary Albania or, more starkly, Somalia
and the Democratic Republic of Congo, where those people mobile enough to
escape the hinterland are forced once again to become predators or supplicants,
this time in the cities, as in the Middle Ages.
On the other hand, there may emerge new levels of social organization that
combine social identity and solidarity, common economic interests, and embry50
onic political organization—what have been called “spheres of authority.”
However, it is unclear whether these spheres will be relatively consistent and
uniform entities, on the one hand, or highly irregular, uneven, ad hoc political
spaces, on the other. It is unclear even if they will be large and well enough organized to be effective—that is, whether they will enjoy sufficient economies of
scale to pursue effectively common interests or provide public goods. Evidence
seems to point to the increasing ineffectiveness of such entities in the face of
global and transnational pressures and structural trends, although the interaction of such new spaces with each other and with older structures of governance
may serve to regularize them somewhat.
Both of these trends are likely to alter the way economic interests are articulated and aggregated. Changes in institutions, the fluidity of territorial boundaries, and the increasing hegemony of global cities will interact with new forms
of “flexible” labor processes and economic organization to increase inequalities
and turn downwardly mobile workers (especially the less skilled, the ghetto
dwellers, etc.) into a new Lumpenproletariat, underclass, or subcaste—a process
well under way in the First World and already dominant today in large parts of
the Third World. In this context, it will not be primarily ethnic loyalties and
tribal enmities that will undermine the community represented by the nationstate, although they have so far been the leading edge of cultural fragmentation.
It will be the development of complex new inequalities of both real class and virtual geography. Such inequalities will be far more difficult to counterbalance
and neutralize without effective or legitimate state institutions, and, especially
when they are allied to other cleavages, they are likely to constitute an increasing
source of civil and cross-border violence.
Fragmented Identities
Such a situation will not merely be one of fragmentation but one of multiple loy51
alties and identities. As in the Middle Ages, occupational solidarity, economic
class, religious or ethnic group, ideological preference, national or cosmopolitan
values, loyalty to or identity with family, local area, region, etc., will no longer be
so easily subsumed in holistic images or collective identities. Indeed, a
neomedieval world will be one of social and political schizophrenia, with
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shifting patchwork boundaries and postmodern cultural images. National identities are likely to become increasingly empty rituals, divorced from real legiti52
macy, “system affect,” or even instrumental loyalty.
On the other hand, the question of how such multiple identities can coexist in
a stable fashion has led some observers to attempt to develop analogies for the
unifying ideological and cultural role of the Roman Catholic Church in the
Middle Ages. These writers have attempted to identify possible successors to this
role in a neomedieval world—perhaps New Age philosophy or the environmental movement. However, any truly global cultural identity structure will have to
be not homogeneous or unifying but intrinsically multilayered and amorphous.
Paradoxically, however, this shapeless postmodernity gives identity increased
flexibility and resilience in a globalizing world, a chameleon-like adaptability to
a wide range of differentiated contexts. Identities are not overarching and
global—in the way, for example, that ecologists refer to “the planet,” or gaia—
but, like the institutions and spaces discussed earlier, seem increasingly to take a
variety of different, often conflicting, forms. Identity and a sense of belonging
have been identified throughout human history as crucial to coherent social
bonds and therefore to political stability and effectiveness. As General Charles
de Gaulle wrote in 1934, “Human passions, insofar as they remain diffused, realize nothing ordered, nor in consequence effective. It is necessary that they be
53
crystallized in well-defined circumscriptions.” This implies a continual search
for identity, not a mere postmodernist fragmentation but concrete attempts to
restore old identities and to construct new ones. At one extreme, small-scale territorially based communities seek to break away from superimposed nationstate identities to insulate themselves and their ways of life from global trends;
the peasants of Chiapas in southern Mexico, for all their use of international revolutionary slogans and images, correspond to this category (about which more
below).
At another level, non–territorially based groups, especially widespread ethnic
and religious groups, may organize in order to control territories of their own;
these irredentist elements range from national liberation movements to those
who claim the same historic territory, such as Palestinians and Israelis, or
Bosnians of different ethnic persuasions. They may also expand to form a transnational movement intended to extraterritorialize their very identities. Terrorist
groups usually involve some admixture of both of these characteristics, with
both a territorial base (e.g., Afghanistan under the Taliban) and an extraterritorial database with extensive network connections (the original meaning of
“al-Qa‘ida”). However, there is also an increasing rediscovery of extensive
cosmopolitan connections. One scholar perceives a historical spread around
the world of “global tribes”—the Jewish diaspora, the British Empire and the
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Anglo-Saxon legacy, the overseas Chinese, the Japanese, today’s Indian diaspora,
54
Latinos, and many others—all on the “road to Cosmopolis.” Others write in
neo-Marxist terms of “transnational classes” and a newly embedded transna55
tional hegemony of capital. In this process of identity “fragmegration,” the
sociocultural face of a globalizing world looks very different from that of increasingly crystallized “national culture societies” of the nation-state era and
56
more like a neomedieval one.
The Spread of “Zones Grises”
Finally, in a neomedieval world, there will not only be “niches” for the maintenance of pluralist autonomy for individuals and groups to organize into
Rosenau’s spheres of authority or to pursue policy goals at multiple levels of governance, but there will also be increased escape routes—and organizational opportunities—for those operating more or less “outside the law.” Exit from
political society is likely to become a more viable option for a wider range of
actors and activities. At one level, such phenomena involve more than just international (and domestic) criminal activities like the drug trade or the (semitransnational) Russian mafia; they also involve the areas where excluded people
live—especially urban ghettoes, at one geographical extreme, and enclaves in inaccessible areas (jungle, mountains, etc.), as noted earlier. Indeed, the toughest
problem in this area is the intersection of different dimensions of extralegal activities with legal or quasi-legal ones. For example, the resources and networks
of the drug trade not only create alternative power structures and social identities for members of the underclass physically located in ghettoes but extend into
state bureaucracies and “legitimate” private firms, as mafias have always
done. Another such gray zone arises from the inevitable constitutional conflicts created by the assertion of indigenous rights over what is legitimately
local and what legitimately supralocal (provincial, national, regional, etc.), as in
57
Chiapas.
At another level, however, it is likely that many traditionally mainstream social and economic activities will expand as much through gray zones as through
legitimate means, much as the so-called black economy has done in many parts
of the world during the modern era. A transnationalized “black” economy constitutes a major challenge to the enforcement function of the competition state,
and the inclusion or integration of such areas and activities into the complex
governance structures of a globalizing world is likely to be extremely uneven. At
a third level is a specifically security-based dimension of this phenomenon that
cuts across borders and regions too—shifting the focus and locus of conflict and
violence even farther away from the interstate pattern and toward the intracta58
ble complexities of the micro and meso levels. The New Security Dilemma
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means that as the reliability of interstate balances of power declines and as alternative possibilities for global and transnational security are found wanting—
that is, as the security deficit grows—the growth of “insecurity from below” creates conditions in which increasingly intractable and complex civil and
cross-border wars will become the norm. Backlashes in turn create new insecurities that states are ill suited to counter. Indeed, projects for a new American hegemony are likely merely to accelerate that spiral in the longer term.
DURABLE DISORDER AND THE SECURITY DEFICIT
As noted earlier, the medieval world was not a world of chaos and breakdown
but one of relatively “durable disorder.” This is also true of today’s world. In this
context, the development of some sort of coherent global security system is unlikely to come from nation-states or the states system as such. Nation-states are,
first, too limited in the scope and scale of what they can do (especially in a
post-hegemonic world), and second, too beholden to narrow domestic interests
to be able to lead such a transformation process, despite the widespread belief in
the United States in the universality of the American ideological message. States
can, of course, play a facilitating role, especially as domestic enforcers of global
norms and practices, and—paradoxically—in pushing forward a process of economic globalization in order to maximize domestic returns, a kind of barrierlowering tit-for-tat. However, such developments will merely widen the security
deficit, not fill it. The New Security Dilemma means that as the reliability of interstate balances of power declines, as alternative possibilities for global and
transnational security are found wanting, and as the process of reshaping the
political environment in reaction to complex globalization remains uneven and
multidimensional in time as well as space, we can expect substate and crossborder destabilization and violence, including but certainly not confined to terrorism, to become increasingly endemic.
Nevertheless, such turbulence does not necessarily mean chaos. Indeed, the
medieval order was a highly flexible one that created a wide range of spaces that
could accommodate quite extensive social, economic, and political innovations—eventually laying the groundwork for the emergence of the postfeudal,
nation-state-based international order. The twenty-first-century globalizing
world order similarly provides manifold opportunities as well as constraints. In
the world of global finance, multinational firms, multilateral regimes, and private authority, therefore, the emerging neomedieval world order is most likely,
reflecting its medieval predecessor, to be a kind of durable yet fertile disorder—
59
what organization theorists today would call a “heterarchical” order. Nationstates will never regain their unitary, sovereign, hierarchical, multifunctional
character, but neither will they be able to appeal to an authoritative world
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government. In this sort of neomedieval world, therefore, the fundamental
question is not whether American hegemony—or that of any other state or
grouping of states—is inherently good or, indeed, bad. There is much to debate
on that question. But no state or group of states as such are likely to meet effectively the challenges thrown up by the New Security Dilemma and so fill the
global security deficit. In this environment, civil wars, ethnic wars, cross-border
wars, warlordism, terrorism, and the like must be addressed not as military
questions but rather as social, economic, and political ones. What is needed is
not so much a war on terror as a political, economic, and social war on the causes
of terror—uneven development, inequality, injustice, and, perhaps most importantly, the incredible frustrations engendered by the revolution of rising expectations in a globalizing world—if the vicious circle of the New Security
Dilemma is to be broken.
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